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ABSTRACT:
This presentation was in response to Kenneth MacKinnon’s defense of
Thomas Reid’s preference for natural virtue against David Hume’s
conventionalism in his theory of law. It is argued that because Hume’s legal
theory follows easily from his theory of human nature, Reid and
Kames—and MacKinnon—need to refute Hume at that level to be
successful in their rejection of his conventionalism.
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There are basically two directions a discussion of this kind of paper can
take. We can assess the relative merits of positions advanced by Hume, Reid and
Kames, for the value that can be derived from them today. And we can quibble
about the particular interpretations that our speaker has put on the eighteenth
century texts. I will attempt to open up both these potential lines of discussion.
It is our good fortune that Ken MacKinnon has taken earlier and more ample
opportunities to develop some of these issues. Although he does not side strongly
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with Kames' criticism of Hume, given the number of ambiguities it entails, he has
claimed that Reid succeeded in showing against Hume "that justice is a natural
virtue."1 Reid's argument is that "as all works of men are imperfect, human laws
may be unjust; which could never be, if justice had its origin from law...."2
Mackinnon agrees with Reid on this point because "far from being the product of
law, justice stands against law, as a yardstick for assessing law's moral worth for
the use both of lawmakers and their critics."3
Mackinnon is aware of the limitations of this natural lawyer's position
which reduces the certainty of law. But he appears to side with Reid in favoring
the approach for its advantages in allowing one "to ensure the justice of each
action."4 But why should we expect Hume to be overturned by the observation
that human laws are imperfect? More of this later.
On the side of interpretation, we should remember that it was Hume who
characterized the debate over natural and artificial justice as to a great extent
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"merely verbal."5 For "the word "natural" is commonly taken in so many senses
and is of so loose a signification, that it seems vain to dispute whether justice be
natural or not."6 He finds justice and property undoubtedly natural if one means
by that not usual or not miraculous. And further, "if self-love, if benevolence be
natural to man; if reason and forethought be also natural; then may the same
epithet be applied to justice, order, fidelity, property, society."7 But the young
Hume believed that the idea of artifice, which he had developed in such detail in
his account of human cognition, should also perform a fundamental role in his
account of morals and politics. And so he called justice "artificial".
It is not easy to make a sustained comparison and evaluation of Reid and
Kames against Hume for the reasons that Ken MacKinnon has outlined. For his
two critics were speaking from partial theories which also remained in flux (and
radically so for Reid up until his death). Hume on the other hand had announced a
full blown theory of man with a thoroughly worked out system of cognitive,
affective, and moral propositions while yet in his mid-twenties, and never changed
his fundamental views, but rewrote in later years primarily to improve the style
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and appeal of the arguments.
The intentions of his critics are not nearly so clear as those of Hume.
Kames objects instinctively to Hume's brazen rejection of natural rights. But in
his own analyses of the law tends to lapse into utilitarian justifications that are not
easily distinguished from Hume's. Reid advances a more aggressive account in
terms of natural rights, but like Hume, appreciates the limiting force of reason and
the common good. Yet Kames and Reid share our normal fear of going the whole
hog with Hume and bluntly recognizing a fundamentally artificial element in
human justice.
But what are their alternatives? If you deny Hume's view, as they clearly
wanted to do, you must hold some ground for justice more basic than human
convention. But what can be the point? If human conventions, as described by
Hume, are formed by men in the free pursuit of their mutual advantage as rules
which will multiply the opportunities of all for self-improvement, natural rights
could only play a significant role as limitations on the range of acceptable
conventions.
But do they impose limits derived from moral wrongs in some cosmic sense
unrelated to human welfare? Clearly not. For Kames and Reid the naturalness of
justice is focused negatively on injuries that are resented by all men. But such
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universal sentiments for human welfare are explicitly accounted for in Hume's
theory of convention. Men will not ordinarily combine to do themselves injury.
Do theories of natural rights assert that men are primarily motivated to just
action and to avoid injustice, and that therefore authoritative conventions are
unnecessary? Indeed, this would seem to be the implicit assumption of even
contemporary rights theorists who believe that judges should reach beyond the
rules of a legal system to invoke rights directly in seeking just resolutions of cases.
Such an approach indeed gives natural rights a meaningful role. But it fails to
account for the implications of Hume's rather common-sense notion of human
nature. For if men are moved both by self-love and benevolence, and if their
understanding is always limited and contingent, assertions of the existence of
natural rights would be virtually irrelevant in a system of laws administered by
men over men. Unless one is willing to claim that such natural rights will be selfenforcing or will arise accurately, forcefully and spontaneously in every human
breast, society can only protect itself from the evil effects of human weakness
through conventional rules, which will inevitably produce results in many
individual cases which violate someone's sense of justice. If Hume is correct in
his description of human nature and the effectiveness of law as a remedy, can
anyone who believes in justice, even of an absolute variety, fail to appreciate the
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net balance of benefits to humanity that will come from submitting to a regime of
artificial justice? Like Hume, I do not see how they can do so without ignoring
part of the overall problem.
On the other hand, the explosion of interest in rights theories in the last two
decades testifies to a strong dissatisfaction with the bare bones Humean view.
Most of us want some things to be right or wrong, independently of utility. We do
hold moral views. But what role should these play in the law? If Reid (and
MacKinnon) would be satisfied to see them as grounds for criticizing the law and
seeking its improvement, Hume would hardly have an objection. But if they want
to assert that natural rights are law and will ensure justice in individual cases, they
need to expand their theory to explain why Hume's account of human nature and
its implications is mistaken. And this does not appear to have been attempted.
Time permitting, it might be worthwhile to sketch one further perspective
from which these writers might be contrasted. Each of them in the final analysis is
interested in the justification of law. But whereas Hume's skeptical empiricism
leads him to look to experience for evaluative guidance, Kames and Reid want to
rely on intuition or sentiment. They perhaps share the view that there is something
more universal and less arbitrary in such appeals. But Hume's epistemological
investigations have deprived him of every plausible excuse for sharing such views.
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He would expect such reliance to produce uncertainty, injustice by any definition,
and bitter and destructive divisions between men, rather than the public good. So
Hume's justification of law as convention rests on his explanations of human
nature. The natural rights theorists would perhaps have less confidence should
they undertake to provide an alternative theory to explain human nature.

